Design Article
Combating fake chips by controlling supply chain
George Karalias, Rochester Electronics
10/24/2012 9:06 AM EDT
Re-engineering chips
As industry members, industry associations and government agencies work together to develop processes that will increase the identification and seizure of counterfeits, counterfeiters attempt to gear up their technology to stay one step ahead of the law. Components are pulled from e-waste disposal sites throughout Asia, and are then cleaned up and repackaged. Similar to money laundering, the components are sold through a network of companies and through the Internet, so the end buyer has no idea of the origin of the product.
The best rule to follow in order to avoid the acquisition of counterfeit semiconductors is always buy from the original manufacturer or their authorized distributor. But what happens when devices are no longer available from the original manufacturer or its authorized distributors due to end-of-life announcements?
One solution is to work with authorized continuing semiconductor manufacturers that can re-create the device and provide continuing manufacturing services. Recently, a reputable aerospace and electronics manufacturer experienced a critical semiconductor obsolescence scenario. The company needed to outfit 160 military aircraft with a critical semiconductor device — an application-specific integrated circuit in a current loop scheme that decodes internal aircraft safety operations.
Critical to the performance of the aircraft, the semiconductor devices are no longer made by the original semiconductor manufacturer. Without the ability to procure the semiconductor devices through authorized channels, the aerospace and electronics manufacturer was left with few options; either risk buying counterfeit or substandard components through unauthorized sources, redesign the system, or engage with an authorized continuing manufacturer.
After carefully considering the options and the potential impact on its reputation, engineering resources and costs, procurement costs and time-to-market, the aerospace and electronics manufacturer chose to partner with an authorized continuing manufacturer to solve its obsolescence issue.
Utilizing an expansive inventory of wafer-and-die, the continuing semiconductor manufacturer re-created the critical devices, matching the performance characteristics and specifications of the original devices. The continuing manufacturer was able to re-create the semiconductor devices based on a source control drawing; documents, graphs and electronic data from the original manufacturer; and two original device samples.
Without the ability of continuing semiconductor manufacturers to re-engineer critical components, companies would be forced to redesign entire systems or risk purchasing counterfeit/substandard devices. A redesign of an integrated circuit system can potentially cost millions, in addition to a lengthy re-qualification and re-testing process, which would mean innumerable lost hours of development time that could be better spent on creating new products. Continuing semiconductor manufacturers offer a convenient and reliable option, which spares companies from the aforementioned issues intrinsic to pursuing gray market or counterfeit product options. A re-engineered semiconductor is ultimately a fraction of the cost of a re-design, and given the government regulations in place to ensure continuing semiconductor manufacturer integrity, the obvious choice to re-engineer is the only true solution.
About the author:
George Karalias is director of marketing & communications at Rochester Electronics.
See related links:
Chip counterfeiting case exposes defense supply chain flaw
Counterfeit chip reports maintain record pace
Counterfeit parts putting military at risk
IHS projects rise in counterfeit chips
Industry considers counterfeit risk analysis tool
----------------------
If you found this article to be of interest, visit Military/Aerospace Designline where you will find the latest and greatest design, technology, product, and news articles with regard to all aspects of military, defense and aerospace. And, to register to our weekly newsletter, click here.
As industry members, industry associations and government agencies work together to develop processes that will increase the identification and seizure of counterfeits, counterfeiters attempt to gear up their technology to stay one step ahead of the law. Components are pulled from e-waste disposal sites throughout Asia, and are then cleaned up and repackaged. Similar to money laundering, the components are sold through a network of companies and through the Internet, so the end buyer has no idea of the origin of the product.
The best rule to follow in order to avoid the acquisition of counterfeit semiconductors is always buy from the original manufacturer or their authorized distributor. But what happens when devices are no longer available from the original manufacturer or its authorized distributors due to end-of-life announcements?
One solution is to work with authorized continuing semiconductor manufacturers that can re-create the device and provide continuing manufacturing services. Recently, a reputable aerospace and electronics manufacturer experienced a critical semiconductor obsolescence scenario. The company needed to outfit 160 military aircraft with a critical semiconductor device — an application-specific integrated circuit in a current loop scheme that decodes internal aircraft safety operations.
Critical to the performance of the aircraft, the semiconductor devices are no longer made by the original semiconductor manufacturer. Without the ability to procure the semiconductor devices through authorized channels, the aerospace and electronics manufacturer was left with few options; either risk buying counterfeit or substandard components through unauthorized sources, redesign the system, or engage with an authorized continuing manufacturer.
After carefully considering the options and the potential impact on its reputation, engineering resources and costs, procurement costs and time-to-market, the aerospace and electronics manufacturer chose to partner with an authorized continuing manufacturer to solve its obsolescence issue.
Utilizing an expansive inventory of wafer-and-die, the continuing semiconductor manufacturer re-created the critical devices, matching the performance characteristics and specifications of the original devices. The continuing manufacturer was able to re-create the semiconductor devices based on a source control drawing; documents, graphs and electronic data from the original manufacturer; and two original device samples.
Without the ability of continuing semiconductor manufacturers to re-engineer critical components, companies would be forced to redesign entire systems or risk purchasing counterfeit/substandard devices. A redesign of an integrated circuit system can potentially cost millions, in addition to a lengthy re-qualification and re-testing process, which would mean innumerable lost hours of development time that could be better spent on creating new products. Continuing semiconductor manufacturers offer a convenient and reliable option, which spares companies from the aforementioned issues intrinsic to pursuing gray market or counterfeit product options. A re-engineered semiconductor is ultimately a fraction of the cost of a re-design, and given the government regulations in place to ensure continuing semiconductor manufacturer integrity, the obvious choice to re-engineer is the only true solution.
About the author:
George Karalias is director of marketing & communications at Rochester Electronics.
See related links:
Chip counterfeiting case exposes defense supply chain flaw
Counterfeit chip reports maintain record pace
Counterfeit parts putting military at risk
IHS projects rise in counterfeit chips
Industry considers counterfeit risk analysis tool
----------------------
If you found this article to be of interest, visit Military/Aerospace Designline where you will find the latest and greatest design, technology, product, and news articles with regard to all aspects of military, defense and aerospace. And, to register to our weekly newsletter, click here.
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DaveR1234
10/25/2012 7:43 AM EDT
"...it is estimated that 2 percent of all the semiconductors sold last year were counterfeit. That doesn’t sound too threatening.." Who with half a brain would think 2% counterfeit parts is not threatening?
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elektryk321
10/25/2012 10:08 AM EDT
I would just compare to cost of protection and the loss of income (or sth) due to counterfeit.
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SylvieBarak
10/25/2012 1:01 PM EDT
If you were in a helicopter that went down owing to a faulty counterfeit part, or the victim of a faulty counterfeit medical appliance, I'm sure you would see things differently. Sure, 2% doesn't sound like a lot to you... but it's a lot to the people it affects. And it's also just an estimate.
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elektryk321
10/26/2012 4:46 AM EDT
It is just simple calculation. Everyone is calculating the risk of failure, in a bicycles, cars and helicopters. Do you believe there are products 100% safe at any possible situation? If I was a victim of such situation, it will be big loss for me, but for manufacturer I am only number on the paper. Busines is cruel, sometime is cheaper to take some bigger risk and buy insurence in case of problems.
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Dan.Deisz_#2
10/26/2012 11:14 PM EDT
Geez DaveR1234 - lighten up a bit. The author was just saying that the 2% number doesn't sound like a big number.
Dan Deisz
Rochester Electronics
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Yippity
10/25/2012 7:53 AM EDT
No mention of the DLA's Generalized Emulation of Microcircuits (GEM) program which can provide a form, fit, and function replacement for non-available microcircuits using current design and processing technologies? The GEM contract was awarded to SRI International (Cage Code / 03652), perhaps an oversight ?
With regard to "Some companies are working on developing sophisticated identification technologies that can be included in the production of components, but these are also extremely costly." That's hogwash. The DLA recently Mandated the use of botanical DNA marking for high risk chips. It works and it is not "extremely costly".
All in all, a very self-serving article if you ask me.
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Dan.Deisz_#2
10/26/2012 11:06 PM EDT
Yippity,
No oversight at all. Rochester Electronics is well aware of the GEM program and most of the people running it. A part is not "GEM'-ed" and is not available to be "GEM-ed" if it is available by industry. That's a fact. It is only if a part is totally unavailable by an authorized source will the possibility of doing GEM be undertaken.
Regarding your comment about DNA.....Get your facts straight, then come out to talk. Stop quoting the marketing hype and go get a quote for implementation. Figure out how expensive it would be to implement when your part marking is all laser in your current assembly process as it is for many OCM's. Hogwash indeed - ANY part marking strategy mandated onto the OCM's by the 1% market is half-baked at best.
Rochester Electronics is doing something entirely unique here working with the OCM's on our Recreation/Replication strategy. It is an authorized method to get hard-to-get parts like ASICs where the only other choice is to redesign....in a newer technology....and that's not always a good thing to do.
By the way, the GEM program is a good program, but is limited on how far it can go with technology. At some point, having no design archive makes GEMs impossible.
Yippity - your comments show some additional research on your part was needed. Have at it.
Dan Deisz
Rochester Electronics
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Yippity
11/3/2012 9:44 AM EDT
Methinks Thou Dost Protest Too Much. It was I who said that the GEM program was an alternative for "non-available"microcircuits, that's "the fact" as you say.
With regard to the Applied DNA Sciences solution, I am not relying on "hype". I know the facts and suggest to you and your competitors call them, or the DLA, and then tell me it's not worth the money to protect our warfighters.
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Dan.Deisz_#2
11/4/2012 9:33 PM EST
Yippity,
You have magically equated DNA tagging with protecting our warfighters. There is no connection here at all. Tagging known good product penalizes the good guys who can ship pure authorized product. Why didn't DLA insist upon tagging non-Authorized product? Doesn't that make more sense? Tag the product that comes from non-Authorized sources. Tag the material that has the highest odds of being counterfeit. Half the counterfeits reported this year are on active product. HALF! There is a huge procurement problem FIRST. If "protect our warfighters" is getting tossed around, go talk to the CM's and DLA themselves about procurement practices trying to squeeze the last dime out of every system. We should all be focused on the biggest problem first - using the Authorized sources FIRST if available. This alone cuts out half the reported counterfeit product in 2012.
Dan Deisz
Rochester Electronics
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Yippity
11/5/2012 8:22 AM EST
"We should all be focused on the biggest problem first - using the Authorized sources FIRST if available", Dan, I agree, and I believe we can all do more.
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mondoe
10/25/2012 7:58 PM EDT
And the lack of mentioning that the min cost will be in the 10's if not 100's of thousands of $$ for the remanufacture !!. There are benefits to both !!.. Military and others need to make contigency for min 25-50% replacement (service) parts adn possibly even 100% relative to the cost of the product !!. Brokers will always have benefits but hte decision to use Broker (Grey Market) need to be made by experienced/educated decision makers not just the bottom of the run purchasing officer who does not understand the consequences of bad decisions !.
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Dan.Deisz_#2
10/26/2012 11:12 PM EDT
Mondoe,
You make a very important fact, and it rarely gets implemented well. That is ordering enough spares/repairs capability baked into the funded portion of the program. It's a very difficult program for program managers on long-life programs (20+ years). They are only funded for so many years, but must somehow do all the last time buys to secure enough product. We have seen that the only way for this to change on those types of programs requires a very different mindset at the time of program award.
While the author didn't mention pricing, let's assume your pricing ranges are correct. It can still be significantly cheaper to remanufacture product than redesign and qualify a product.
Dan Deisz
Rochester Electronics
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kjdsfkjdshfkdshfvc
10/27/2012 9:26 AM EDT
More stuff I did not know.
http://bit.ly/IC4m9t
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JW Smith
10/28/2012 4:21 PM EDT
I am not sure whether I found the article or the comments more interesting. I can say that while at LSI (along with Dan), I was contacted several times by a company, an agency, or DSCC (DLA) needing more parts. When a quote was given, the usual answer was that they would buy salvaged parts because that was cheaper than another wafer run. And yes we were charging a premium ($10K to $100K as most of processes had to be restarted, recreated and re-qualified. Having the assurance of knowing where the part originated can be better than a part with an unknown pedigree? I believe that many of these issues are a result of NOT controlling the supply chain as the article highlights.
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JW Smith
10/28/2012 4:25 PM EDT
I should say that I am not at Rochester. However from working with Dan, I value his opinions.
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