HANCOCK, N.H. Design automation systems tailored to the task of genetic engineering could prove to be double-edged tools. While they represent a central thrust of the emerging synthetic biology movement, they also can lead to the accidental or deliberate creation of pathogenic biological components.
One expert in the field, Harvard University genetics professor George Church, compared the potential misuse of synthetic biological designs with the danger posed by nuclear weapons. But there is one important difference, in his view it is much harder to build a fusion device than to genetically engineer a pathogen. And the complexity of biological processes also increases the danger of accidents.
By reducing the molecular biology of the cell to a list of standard modules with predictable behavior, professional biodesigners could engineer molecular machines in much the same way that system-on-chip designers create silicon systems. Just as a circuit designer does not need to be an expert in silicon physics and manufacturing processes, the future biodesigner will not need a detailed knowledge of biochemistry to effectively create complex biochemical machines.
"Even if we don't have bioterrorists and teen-age biohackers, we will still create things that do not have the properties that we thought they would," Church said. The problem is that the body has not evolved a general ability to fend off artificial biological agents. "Even if you are genetically resistant and even if you are recently immunized you will have problems with this type of bug."
Church chaired a panel on the problems and opportunities of DNA synthesis at the recent Synthetic Biology 1.0 conference, held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology earlier this month. A critical question for researchers and entrepreneurs entering the new field is what form technology regulation should take. Church suggested that anyone designing systems with synthetic biological components be required to have a license, which would entail passing basic competency tests.
Licensing might head off the possibility of unintended side effects by maintaining a level of competency among the people in the profession, but would do little to prevent deliberate attempts by terrorists or hackers to create pathogens. The continuing problems the Internet is experiencing with computer viruses that are released secretly give some indication of the problems that synthesized self-replicating systems pose. While the barrier to entry for building a computer or network is very high, once built, it becomes a vehicle for much smaller bits of code that someone with only a low level of expertise can release into the system.
Biological synthesis becomes fairly easy once the basic building blocks the oligonucleotides have been built, so the regulation of the whole process could be centered on licensing and tracking them.
"Our experience with computer viruses is that people that do this kind of thing are rather sloppy, they're not very good at covering their tracks," said Tom Knight, who directs MIT's BioBrick wet lab in the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. "There is an opportunity here because the oligonucleotides contain a lot of information which can be used to track and monitor what is being done with them."
As an experiment, Knight assembled a list of the oligonucleotides used in his lab and asked himself whether he would be able to predict what was being built with them. "It's not a double-blind experiment, because I already know what we are building with them, but I managed to convince myself that it would be easy to determine that even if I didn't know," he said.
The situation is similar to the nuclear industry, where difficult-to-produce fissionable material is closely tracked and stored in secure facilities. Something similar could be done for oligonucleotide production and distribution.