Responding to a Crosstalk piece by Stephen Wren appearing in the June 11, 2007, issue of EE Times ("Patent 'deform' movement smells fishy," page 64): Stephen Wren tried very hard in his letter to dispute the need for patent reform by bringing up all the red-herring issues around the "small inventor." He completely ignored the problems of the current patent system, starting with the court-imposed "lack of obviousness" defense and the utterly miserable state of the so-called software and business-method patents. At least the Supreme Court finally reined in the Circuit Court on the issue of obviousness. Now we just need it to eliminate software and business-method patents and allow the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to get back to the work of analyzing "real" patents.
Mr. Wren wrote an informative letter about something no one cares about. There are no real problems with hardware patents in the current system. There will always be companies like RCA and RIM that will try to game the system. As long as they are arguing about real hardware patents, I have no problem with the current system.
We really need to rein in the USPTO and the Circuit Court and force them to completely disallow the so-called software and business-method patents. These are not real hardware patents, but ideas. The patent system is designed to cover devices, not ideas. How long will it take the Patent Office to come to its senses and completely eliminate these bogus categories?
Joe Kelsey
Software Engineer
Avtech Corp.
Seattle
Offshore, TI Phils. gets DSP prize
Responding to the article "Malaysia feels the squeeze on both sides," by Jonathan Hopfner (see June 4, page 33), the following statement is wrong:
"Like Intel, Texas Instruments Inc. has a lengthy history in Malaysia, which is home to TI's largest assembly and test site. But when it came time to choose the locale for a new, $1 billion packaging megaplant, TI elected for the Philippines."
This is wrong. TI Phils., started some 20 years ago, has been TI's biggest facility outside the United States. This plant churns out TI's newest DSPs and other chips (back-end assembly) to power almost 99 percent of Nokia phones. And all the while, Intel's plant in the Philippines was home to the back-end assembly of Pentium and a host of other high-end Intel chips.
Arnel Uy
arnel.uy@gmail.com
Texas Instruments Phils. Inc.
Engineer, former employee
Use the right math for HP's growth
I am writing to you about the article "Did you know?" that says HP's Compaq deal is not a bust (see June 11, page 40). The article compares HP now with HP before the merger, how it has nearly doubled in the five years or so since the merger. If you want to analyze how HP has done since the merger, you have to add in Compaq. In FY 2001, the last fiscal year before the merger, Compaq had revenue of $33.5 billion and HP had $45.2 billion. To compare [that] with HP's predicted revenue of $100 billion in the article, you need to compare that with $78.7 billion in fiscal year 2001.
So a true measure of the growth for HP since the merger is somewhere on the order of 28 percent, which is not bad. But over six years, that begins to look much smaller--somewhere around 4 percent a year.
I am not arguing with the other points you have to say about HP. And I don't hate Carly [Fiorina], I rooted for her to change HP. But I don't like being treated like a fool, or for the press to put out a foolish analysis.
I think you owe an apology to your readers. If you would like to check my numbers, look at the Compaq and HP filings on the SEC's Edgar Web site.
Michael Palma
Bolaji Ojo responds: Thank you for your letter. The HP/Compaq merger occurred in 2002. Following this, the company began reporting adjusted revenue for the combined company as required by the SEC. Take a look at the chart accompanying the report. In 2003 (that is, one year after the merger formally closed), the new HP reported revenue of $73 billion (adjusted for the Compaq merger). Revenue in the next year was $80 billion, followed by $87 billion in 2005 and $92 billion in 2006. That translates to steady if unexciting growth.
Separately, the companies would have had smaller growth. Also, my report didn't focus exclusively on the revenue increase that resulted from the merger but also mentioned the purchasing power the company gained. The new HP is even more dependent upon hardware sales than ever compared with IBM, which notably moved away from hardware toward higher-margin software and consulting businesses. HP's hardware concentration "problem" predates the Compaq acquisition, but the company has made the best of its dependence on hardware sales. What it will become tomorrow is one issue the current management has yet to figure out. I refer you to my concluding paragraph: "If hardware is where the future HP hopes to generate its profit, then its managers are doing just right. If not, they have a long field to plow."
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